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about. by diseat.so and other causes, I have been able, in a criminal
case, to demonstrate to the court aid jury, by means of drawings,
the difference between the blood of two individuals, without having
previously been informed of the fact of disease in one of the parties.
This will be understood by physicians ; referring to cases of Leuk'muia, as also, perhaps, to those cases of venereal disease connected
with intemperance, a number of which I have myself examined,
and have recorded by means of drawings. I have also been able,
in a criminal case, to find, by means of the microscope, pieces of
shaven beard, spiculm of bone, brain matter, &c., which would have
settled the charge of murder, had it not been possible to decide the
question first propounded as to the kind of blood under examination.
R. U. PIrui, M. D., Chicago.
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Where the cestut que trust of real estate has an absolute interest without any

control in the trustee, the former may, As a general rule, alien his estate. Where
the cesti has been in possession a long time, the court may direct a jury to presume a conveyance from the trustee to perfect the title, or may itself act upon the
same presumption.
But where the legal title is in a trustee, though only for a naked trust to
convey, a purchaser from the cestui que trust will not, in the absence of an express
agreement to accept the equitable title only, be compelled, on a bill for specific
performance, to accept the title from the cestui unless it is perfected by a conveyance of the legal estate from the trustee.

BILL in equity for specific performance of an agreement for the
sale and purchase of real estate. It appeared that the complainants
held under a deed from the Providence Aqueduct Co. to Zephaniah
Wood, which contained the following habendum:
"To have and to hold the above bargained premises to him, the
said Zephaniah Wood, his heirs and assigns for ever, in special trust,
however, to and for the following uses and purposes, to wit:
"The said Wood and his successor or successors in this trust
shall hold said premises to and for the sole and separate use and
benefit of Charlotte M. Read, wife of Horace Read, of said Providence, for and during the full term of her natural life, separate
from and independent of any interference or control of her present
or of any future husband, he, the said Wood, paying over to her,
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and her only, all the rents and profits of said premises, or permitting her to occupy the same according to her sole election. In
case the said Charlotte M. shall decease during the lifetime of the
said Horace Read, the said Wood, his successor or successors in
this trust, shall convey said bargained premises to him, the said
Horace Read, his heirs and assigns, in fee simple. In case the
said Charlotte M. survives the said Horace Read, then the said
Wood, or his successor or successors In said trust, shall, on the
decease of said Charlotte M., convey said bargained premises to
the rightful and lawful heirs of the said Horace Read in fee simple."
Charlotte M. Read survived Horace Read, and was dead. The
complainants were the heirs at law of Horace Read. Zephaniah
Wood was also dead, and no conveyance of the realty had been
made to the heirs of Horace Read.
The respondent admitted the agreement on his part to purchase
the realty described in the bill of complaint, but objected to the
relief asked for by the complainants, on the ground of their inability to convey to him a good title in the realty.
Vineent J' Carpenter, for complaifnants.
Joseph B. Spink, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
POTTER, J.-That where an absolute interest is given to the
cestuis que trust, without any control in the trustee, it is, as a
general rule, alienable, it pretty well settled: Perry on Trusts,
§§ 386-388; 1 Cruise Dig. *407, *343.
In the present case we cannot consider the estate as.executed in
the cestui, because the trustee has still a duty to perform, i. e. to
convey the estate upon a certain event, which, it is agreed, has
happened.
Where the cestui has Occupied for a long time, a court will, in
some cases, direct a jury to presume a conveyance from the trustee,
if necessary to perfect the legal title; and where a court would
direct a jury to do it, the court may well act themselves upon the
same presumption: 1 Cruise Dig. *415.
In the present case we do not think the circumstances would
warrant acting upon any such presumption.
A decree may be made for a specific performance of an agreement to convey an equitable estate, if it be so expressed in the
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agreement: Sngd. Vend. & Pur., cl. 8, see. 2, § 2. In the 8th
Amer. ed., by Perkins, cl. 5, sec. 3, § 50.
But as in this case the agreement does not specify it to be an
equitable estate, the purchaser is entitled, if he chooses, to have
the estate perfected by a conveyance from the trustees, at the
expense of the vendor; otherwise he ought not to be obliged to
accept the title.
The question as to the kind or quality
of title a purchaser is bound to accept
from a vendor, has frequently arisen
and received varied adjudication, as
might perhaps he expected, from the
widely variant circumstances in which
the point has arisen.
In Sdgirick v. Iargrare,2 Vesey
Sen. 59, the Master of the Rolls remarked that he had heard it said, the
title of a vendor must he like Comsar's
wife, not only pure but unsuspected ; yet
while this may be the ideal standard of
the excellence of a title, in practice
very few titles are found wholly free
from stain.
In determining upon questions of title,
mere possibilities, it has been said, are
not to be regarded ; the court which is
called upon to decide must govern
itself by a moral certainty; for it is
impossible in the nature of things that
there should be a mathematical certainty
of a good title: Cooper v. Denne, 1
Vesey Jr. 565, and cases there cited.
The question of sufficiency of title
has most frequently arisen in suits to
enforce a specific performance of contract, and since the exercise of the
jurisdiction by courts of equity is discretionary they will refuse it, at the
instance of the vendor, where his title
is involved in difficulties that cannot he
removed : 2 Story's Eq. Juris. 749, 750.
Thus a purchaser is not bound to take
a property which he can otily acquire
by litigation and judicial decision
Price v. Strange, 6 Mad. Chan. 104.
And a vendee is not bound to accept
a title depending on a conveyance to a
creditor where there is evidence to raise

suspicion that the object of the conveyanc'e was to elude other creditors; nor
where there is a covenant for title, and
there are unextinguished ground-rents
upon the land: Guns v. Renshaw, 2
Barr (Penna.) 34.
Neither will a court of chancery
compel a party to accept a title that is
essentially defective,: Watts v. Waddle,
I McLean 203; or one that is not substantially a good title: Beclwitl v.
Kouns, f B. Monroe 222; nor where
it appears from the allegations of the
bill that the vendor has no title: Fitzpatrick v. Featherstone, 3 Ala. 40;
unless the vendee has assumed the risk
of the title, or has agreed to take such
a title as the vendor is able to give:
Bates v. Delavan, 5 Paige Chan. 299.
So a defect in the title to a few acres
of a large estate may often be a fair
subject of compensation, but where the
part to which a good title cannot be
made, is, though small in quantity,
essential to a full enjoyment of the remainder, a specific performance cannot
be enforced by the vendor: Knatchbull
v. Gruler, 1 Mad: Chan. 91 ; Stoddart
v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355.
On t]e other hand, it may be said that
courts will not be astute to sustain technical defects ; but in every case of doubt
will consider whether the defect will
impair the marketable value of the
property : Lord Braybrake v. Inskip, 8
Vesey Jr. 428.
Thus, it has been held, that a purchaser cannot insist upon the vendor's
establishing a will against the heir:
Mlorrison v. Arnold, 19 Vesey Jr. 673.
And in some cases he will be com-
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pelled to take title though it arises under
a will which has not been proved in
equity against the heir: Colton v. Wilson
3 Peere Williams 190.
So, a party may be compelled to take
a title obtained by a solicitor from his
client, where otherwise valid : Spencer
v. Tophain, 22 Beav. 582. Likewise
under a deed of trust in favor of creditors as against a previous voluntary
conveyance : Butterfield v. Heath, 15
Beav. 408; Buckler. Mitchell, 13 Vesey
Jr. 100.
The general doctrine is, that trustees
for the payment of debts generally, can
make a good title to a purchaser who is
not bound to look to any specific disposition subsequently directed by the deed
or will creating the trust: Jenkins v.
Hiles, 6 Vesey Jr. 654; Siith v.
Guyon, 1 Brown C. C. 185; Rogers v.
Skillicorne, Ambler 189
Villiamson v.
Curtis, 3 Brown C. C. 95 ; Balfour v.
Welland, 16 Vesey Jr. 205.
Again, a purchaser cannot insist on
being discharged upon a report by a
master of defective title, if it is capable
of being made good within a reasonable
time: Coffin v. Cooper, 14 Vesey Jr.
205.
It is sufficient if the vendor is able to
make a good title at any time before
the decree is pronounced, although he
had not a good title when the contract
was made: Hepburn v. Auld, 5 Cranch

262; Finley v. Lynch, 3 Bibb 366;
Seyinour v. DeLancey, 3 Cowen 445;
Pierce v. Nichols, 1 Paige 244; Dutch
Church v. Moll, 7 Id. 78; Baldwin v.
Salter, 8 Id. 473.
The taking of possession by a purchaser where a deed has been executed
may be a waiver of objections to the
title : Caicrafi v. Roebuck, I Vesey Jr.
225; Colton v. Milson, 3 Peere Williams 189.
But the taking of possession by the
vendee under a contract will not of
itself be a waiver of objections: Gans
Renshaw, 2 Barr 35. And it would
seem, that it should not be in any case,
unless accompanied with knowledge of
the state of the title, and circumstances
from which an express waiver of objections may be inferred.
It is obvious that the principles by
which the sufficiency of the title is to
be determined, would be the same whether the question should arise upon a bill
for specific performance, an action of
covenant, or one for the purchase-money,
or, where it grows out of a special contract. We think the current of authority will sustain the doctrine that where
there are no sach substantial defects in
the title as ought to impair its marketable value, a purchaser may be compelled to accept it.
C. H. W.
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A judgment rendered without jurisdiction may be impeached even in a collateral proceeding.
The want of jurisdiction, by reason of the party sued not having notice of the
action, may be shown by parol evidence, even in a collateral proceeding.
And such evidence is admissible to contradict the return of a sheriff or other
officer set out on the record.
In an action of ejeetment, where one party claims under a sheriff's deed upon a
record of a judgment and execution, the other party may show by parol evidence
that the judgment is void for want of notice to the defendant of the original writ,
although the record affirmatively shows a return of service upon him.
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Ix error from Wyandotte County.
The opition of the court was delivered by
YALENTINI., J.-This was an action in the nature of ejectment.
The plaintiff clainied title to the land in controversy, under a
sheriff's deed, purporting to convey such land from one Jane Hicks
Brown, the judgment debtor. The defendants claimed title under
a deed executed by said Jane Hicks Brown herself. The main
question in the case is whether said sheriff's deed is valid or not.
But involved in this question are these other questions: Can a
constable's return of service on an original summons in a justice's
court, and all subsequent proceedings founded thereon, including a
sheriff's deed, be impeached in an action in the nature of ejectment by evidence alunde, showing said constable's return to be
false, and showing that the defendant, in the justice's court, never
in fact had any notice of the pendency of the suit in such court?
It appears from the record in this case that, on December 15th
1860, one S. P. Bartlett commenced an action in'a justice's court,
in Wyandotte county, Kansas, on two promissory notes against
said Jane Hicks Brown. A summons was duly issued by the justice and delivered to H. H. Sawyer, constable. Afterwards the
constable returned the same with the following endorsement thereon, to wit: "Executed on the 15th December 1860, by leaving a
certified copy at the usual place bf residence of the within named
defendant, Jane Hicks Brown. I. II. SAwYER, constable." Jane
Hicks Brown made no appearance in the justice's court; and,
therefore, at the proper time, the justice rendered judgment against
her by default for $38.85 and costs. Afterwards, a transcript of
this judgment was duly filed in the District Court, execution was
issued thereon, said land was sold under the same, the sale was
duly confirmed by the District Court; the sheriff then, on March
25th 1865, executed a deed for the land to the purchaser, which
deed was duly recorded February 1st 1866; the purchaser took
possession of the land under his deed, and he and those holding
under him continued to hold the possession tlneieof until in 1871,
when P. 11. Tertelling, the then holder of said land under said
sheriff's deed, having mortgaged the land to the plaintiff in this
case, and having become a bankrupt, abandoned the land, and
l.arzilla Gray, the holder of the adverse title, took possession
thereof. 'The land was sold under the .bankruptcy proceedings
against Tertelling, and Mastin, the plaintiff in this action, became
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the purchaser for the purpose of obtaining payment of his said
mortgage. He received his deed from the assignee in bankruptcy
on August 80th 1872. Now if said sheriff's deed is valid, then
the land in controversy belongs to the plaintiff, Mastin; but if it
is not valid, then the land belongs to the defendant, Barzilla Gray,
and the whole question depends upon the validity or invalidity of
said constable's return. It also appears from the record in this
case, that Jane Hicks (that was her maiden name) was a Wyandotte Indian woman. In the spring of 1860, she resided in
Wyandotte county, Kansas, with a Wyandotte Indian man by the
name of Leatider Brown. Whether they were married or not is
not shown. During that spring they had a misunderstanding, ind
Jane Hicks left Brown and went to the Indian Territory to reside.
Afterwards Brown married another woman, with whom he lived for
seven years; but in 1869 he commenced to live with Jane Hicks
again. Jane Hicks remained in the Indian Territory during the
whole of the remainder of the year 1860, after she first went there,
and she had no residence in Kansas after the spring of 1860.
Therefore the return of the constable, that he served said summons
on the 15th of December 1860, "by leaving a certified copy at
the usualplace of residence" of said Jane Hicks, cannot be true.
He probably left the copy at the residence of said Leander Brown,
but whether he did or not is not shown by the record.
We now come to the question whether said constable's return, and
tile subsequent proceedings founded thereon, including the sheriff's
deed, can be impeached in this action by evidence aliunde.
A sheriff's deed founded on a void judgment is of course void:
37orth v. Moore, 8 Kansas 143; Shields v. Miller, 9 Id. 390. A
judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void: Butcher v. Bank,
2 Kansas 70. And a personal judgment, rendered without notice
to tbe defendant, is rendered without jurisdiction, and is consequently, void: Case v. ifannahs,2 Kansas 490, 496; K.P.Railway Co. v. Streeter, 8 Kansas 133. This far we think -all the
authorities agree. A sheriff's return of service of original process
may, in a direct proceeding and before judgment, be impeached so
far as such return states facts which do not come within the personal knowledge of the sheriff himself; such facts, for instance, as
where "the usual place of residence" of the defendant is located:
Bond v. Wilson, 8 Kansas 228. This proposition is denied in
Missouri: Hallowell v. Page, 24 Mo. 590. In many cases such a
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return may be imIpe,che-d for ihlsitv, even after judgment is rendered thereon, and the julgment itself way be declared void:
h
et,.h.s
v. 6aqleight,
Co.,
b., 19 Wall. 59; Carelton v. Bickford,
13 1iray 591; Xorwood v. Cobb, 15 Texas 500; s. c. 24 Id. 551.
And 1probably in all cases such a return may be impeached in a
direct proceeding to perpetually enjoin the judgment founded on
such return, because of the falsity of such return: Chambers v.
Bri, l4lVo., 16 Kansas 270; Earle v. Xc Veigh, 91 U. S. 503.
This proposition is also disputed, and particularly in Nebraska:
Johnson v. Jones, 2 Nebraska 126; though in the Nebraska case
it was really not necessary for the court to decide the question.
A judgment void for want of notice may be set aside at any time,
even after the lapse of more than three years, on a- motion made
therefor by the defendant: JForemanv. Carter,9 Kansas 674. And
this may be (lone, in some cases, even where it requires extrinsic
evidence to show that the judgment was rendered without notice
and without jurisdiction: Ranson v. Walcott, 19 Kans.' 245.
Where the record itself shows that the judgment was rendered
without notice and without jurisdiction, all the courts unite in
holding that the judgment is void, and may be impeached anywhere, and collaterally as well as directly. Where the record is
silent on the subject, a majority of the courts hold that the record
may be impeached collaterally as well as directly, and by extrinsic
as well as internal evidence. And a great majority of the courts
hol that a judgment from another state may be impeached for
want of jurisdiction collaterally as well as directly, and by extrinsic evidence as well as by the record itself: Litowich v. Litowich,
19 Kansas, and cases there cited. But the difficult question to
determine arises when it is attempted to impeach a domestic judgment collaterally and by extrinsic evidence. There are authorities
which hold that it cannot be done: Hahn v. Kelley/, 84 Cal. 391;
Me-Donald v. .Leewright, 31 Mo. 29 ; Callen v. Blison, 13 Ohio
St. 446; Johnson v. Jones, 2 Neb.' 126; Wilcox v. Kassick, 2
Mfich. 165 ; Grangerv. Olark, 22 Me. 128 ; Cook v. Darling, 18
Pick. 393 ; Finneran v. Leonard, 7 Allen 54 ; LZightsey v. Harris,
20 Ala. 409; Coit v. Haven, 30 Conn. 190. While there are
other authorities which hold that it may be done: Ferguson v.
Crau:ford, decided by the New York Court of Appeals, September
18, 1877, 4 Law & Eq. Rep. 682; Adams X. Saratoga J- Wash.
Railroad Co., 10 N. Y. 328, 332, et seq.; Bolton v. Jacks, 6
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Robert. N. Y. 166, 198; Porter v. Bronson, 29 How. Pr. 292;
Tebbetts v. Tilton, 31 N. H. (11 Frost) 273; Sanborn v. Fellows,
22 N. H. (2 Frost) 273, 288, 289. And there are many authorities which tend to uphold'the doctrine that any judgment rendered
without jurisdiction may be- impeached in any proceeding; and
that in doing so, anything contained in the record (of which such
judgment forms a part) purporting to give or to prove jurisdiction,
such as the recital of a sheriff's return or service of summons, or
a service by publication, or any constructive service, or any appearance by attorney, or a finding by the court of such service, notice
or-appearance, may be impeached and contradicted by any evidence, extrinsic as well as intrinsic, and may be shown to -be
untrue and false: Elliott v. Pi rsoll, 1 Pet. '828, 840; .Rickey_
v. Stewart, 3 How. 750; Skelton V'.Tiffin, 6 How. 163; Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 450; Webster v. Reid, 11 How.
437, 460; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Knowles v.
Gaslight, &c., Co., 19 Wall. 58; Earle v. Me Vegh, 91 U. S.
503; Borden v. Fitch, 15 John. 121, 141 ; Latham v. Edgerton,
9 Cow. 227 ; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148, 156 ; Stumway
v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 448, 453 ; Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. H. 164;
Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328, 332,
et seq. ; Pollardv. Wagner, 13 Wis. 569, 576 ; Russell v. Perry,
14 N. H. 152 ; Norwood v. Cobb, 15 Tex. 500, and same case 24
Tex. 551 ; .fovan v. Wahrenberger,9 Tex. 813 ; Price v. Ward,
25 NrJ. L. (1 Dutch.) 225.; Carleton v. Bickford, 13 Gray 591;
Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 880 ; Miller v. Handy, 40 Ill. 448 ;
Coolper v. Sunderland, 3 Iowa 114, 127 ; Pollard v. Baldwin, 22
Iowa 328.
The decisions upon the question which we are n.ow discussing
are conflicting and contradictory, and of course they cannot all be
good law. The ease of Hahn v. Kelley, ante, is disapproved in,
the case of Galpin v. Page, 3 Sawyer ,94, 106, et seq. (This last
-decision following that of Gadpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350.) The
case of McDonald v. Leewright, ante, is decided upon the #sole
ground that a sheriff's return cannot be impeached in any case,
Oxcept in an action against the sheriff for a false return; wvhich
ground, as we have already seen, is wholly untenable in Kansas.
The case of Callen v. Ellison, ante, seems to enunciate the doetrine that a judgment rendered upon an appearance by an attorney
cannot be impeached in a collateral proceeding by showing that
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such attorney had no authority to make any such appearance. The
decision in the case last mentioned may, perhaps, not go quite to
this extent. *If it does not, then it is not applicable to this case ;
but if it does. then it will be found to be in conflict with the following decisions heretofore cited, to wit: Shelton v. Tiffin; Starbuck v. Xurray; Shumway v. Stillman; Kerr v. IKerr; Pice
v. W1ard, and Aldrich v. Kinney. See, also, Bodurtha v. Goodrich, 8 Gray 508.
The decision in the case of Johnson v. Jones, ante, relating to
the impeachment of judgments for want of jurisdiction, is -but little
more than dictum, and very bad dictum too. The case would have
been decided in precisely the. same way that it was decided, even
if such decision had not been made., The effect of this decision,
or rather dictum, is as follows: Whdre a judgment is rendered
against a person who has never had any notice either of the action
or of the judgment, lie must, nevertheless, take notice thereof
within the time "provided by law for appeal, review, rehearing, or
impeaclment by writ of error," and resort to such remedy, or he
will be for ever remediless. It is his own fault if he does not ascertain within such time that such judgment was rendered against
him. le has no right to remain ignorant of the rendition of such
judgment, and consequently to remain quiet and inactive. He has
no right to wait until he receives actual notice of the judgment, by
an attempt being made to enforce it hgainst him ; and if he does
so wait, he cannot then maintain an action to have the judgment
declared void, or to perpetually enjoin its enforcement.
I
The case of Wilcox v. Kassick, ante, was an action 'of debt on
a judgment from a siater state. The record upon its face showed
jurisdiction, and the.judgment appeared to be valid, and the court
in that case held that such judgment could not be impeached for
want of jurisdiction. There are other cases holding the same thing
which we have not cited. They so hold, upon the theory that a
judgment from a sister state is just as good as a domestic judgmenit, and that a domestic judgment could not be so impeached.
The theory that a jhdgment from a sister state is entitled to the
same faith and credit as a domestic judgmeitt, is unquestionably
correct. It is sustained by all' the authorities, from the decision
in the cas6 of Mills v. JDuryee, 7 Cranch 481, down to the present
day. And of course, if a domestic judgment cannot be impeached
collaterally and by extrinsic evidence, a judgment from a sister
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state cannot be so impeached. But the authority is now overwhelming that a judgment from a sister state may be so impeached.
See cases cited in case of Litowich v. Litowich, ante. And hence
the decision in the case of WVilcox v. Kassick, ante, cannot be
considered as very high authority for the doctrine that a domestic
judgment cannot be impeached.
The cases of Granger v. Clark and Cook v. Darling, ante, do
not seem to have received much consideration from the courts that
decided them; and the decision in the case of .Finneranv. Leo::ard, ante, is founded on that in the case of Cook v. Darling. The
case of Cook v. Darling makes a distinction between the records
of courts of superior jurisdiction and courts of inferior jurisdiction,
holding that a judgment of an inferior court may be impeached
collaterally for want of jurisdiction, while a judgment of a superior
court cannot be so impeached. The judgment sought to be impeached in the case at bar is a judgment of a court of inferior
jurisdiction. The case of Lightey v. Harris,ante, is very much
like the case of McDonald v. Leewright, ante. The case of Coit
v. Haven, ante, is like the case of Cook v. Darling,ante, in making
a distinction between courts of superior and inferior jurisdiction.
Several of the cases cited as showing that judgments may be
impeached collaterally for want of jurisdiction, are open to objections as to their exact applicability to the case at bar. But still it
will be found in all of them, that either the decision of the court
itself, or the language of the judge in delivering the opinion of the
court, is applicable. Of course, all decisions made by state courts
concerning the impeachment of domestic judgments collaterally
and by extrinsic evidence, are exactly applicable to the present
case, unless such decisions are controlled by.local statutes. Also
all decisions made by federal courts, in cases commenced in the
same state in which the judgments sought to be so impeached were
rendered, are clearly applicable. (This includes the decisions in
the cases of Elliott v. Piersol; Hickey v. Stewart; Shelton v.
Tffin ; Williamson v. Berry, and Webster v. Reid, cited, ante.)
If thi case had been commenced in the federal courts instead of
in the itate courts, as it was, the federal courts would undoubtedly
have allowed the said judgment against said Jane Hicks Brown to
be impeached. We also think that all decisions of state courts
allowing judgments from other states to be impeached collaterally
and by extrinsic evidence, are applicable to this case. It is now
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settled beyond all controversy, that judgments from sister states,
wherever they can be used, are entitled to the same faith and credit
is domestic jttdgnents. That is, although an execution cannot be
issued upon them directly, nor are they liens upon real estate
directly, yet when they are sought to be used as evidence, or as
the fibndation for other actions, they are entitled to the same faith
and credit as domestic judgments. Now, as nearly all courts hold
that judgments from sister states may be impeached collaterally for
want of jurisdiction and by extrinsic evidence, it is substantially a
holding that domestic judgments may also be impeached under like
circumstances. Proceedings instituted for the purpose of destroying,
impairing or modifying the force or effect of a judgment for all
cases, such as proceedings to reverse, vacate, set aside, declare void,
suspend, modify or perpetually enjoin a judgment, are direct proceedings. But a proceeding instituted for some other purpose, and
in which the question of the force or effect of the judgment arises
only incidentally, is a collateral proceeding. A judgment rendered
with jurisdiction can never be impeached in a collateral proceeding.
But a judgment rendered without jurisdiction may. In fact, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is no judgment at all. Ajudgment cannot be rendered against any person until he has had his
day in court, and until le has had an opportunity to be heard. Tc
say that the record of a judgment can conclusively prove that any
person was a party to the action in which it was rendered, and
then to say that the judgment is conclusively valid because he was
a party, is to reason illogically. It is begging the question. It is
reasoning in a circle. That is, the judgment proves that he was a
party, and being a party proves the validity of the judgment.
There was no finding in this case by the court rendering the judgment that said Jane Hicks Brown was served with notice, or that
she was in fact a party to the suit; but even a finding to that effect
could not make any difference, for a court cannot make a finding
against a person until after the court has obtained jurisdiction of
such person.
In an action in the nature of ejectment, such as the present
action is, the validity of a judgment under which either party
claims title, is just as much in issue as the vafidity of any judgment in any action can be. But there is this difference: in the
most of actions, where the validity of a judgment is put in issue,
the pleadings must specifically show the issue. But in ejectment
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this is not necessary. In ejectrhent all that is necessary for the
plaintiff to do is to allege in his pleading, "that he has a legal or
equitable estate" in the land in controversy, describing the same,
and that he "is entitled to the possession thereof;" while all that
.is necessary for the defendant to do is simply to deny the plaintiff's
allegations. And then everything is in issue that will sustain
either title or defeat either title, and each side is bound to take
notice thereof. Everything is in issue as much as though it was
set out in the pleadings in the most elaborate detail, and with the
greatest circumstantial particularity. Probably no action, except
one to reverse, vacate, modify, suspend or perpetually enjoin a
judgment, can be.said to be a direct attack upon such judgment.
And if not, then ejectment cannot be a direct attack upon any
judgment. But where the validity of a judgment is in issue in
ejectment, the attack upon the judgment is as direct as it can be in
any other action, except an action to reverse, vacate, modify, suspend or perpetually enjoin the judgment, and the parties are in
law and by the nature of the action bound to take notice of this
attack, just as much as they would be in any other action.
The judgment of the court-below will be affirmed.
HORTON, C. J.-I concur in the foregoing opinion; but as the
question is one of very grave importance, I wish to add that, while
it is not to be denied there are numerous decisions of most respect-.
able courts sustaining another rule, in my judgment the conflicting
decisions are based upon insufficient and unsatisfactory reasons.
The prior decisions of this court have settled the law in this state
to be, that an officer's return of service on original process may be
impeached in a direct proceeding before and after judgment, where
the return states facts, as in this case, which do not come within
the personal knowledge of the officer: Bond v. Wilson, 8 Kans.
229 ; Chtambers v. Bridge Aanufactory, 16 Kans. 270 ; Ranson
v. Walcott, 19 Kans.
The new question now involved is, whether this principle shall
be applied in actions in the nature of ejectment, where the plaintiff
seeks to sustain his title by a sheriff's deed based upon a judgment
rendered t a justice of the peace on default, when there has been
in fact, notwithstanding the return of the officer, no service of
summons, nor any waiver thereof. The ablest of the opinions
holding adverse views, concede they violate all principles of natural
justice, but attempt to fortify their forced conclusions on the plea
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Sr plblic )olicy. Now, in this state it is unnecessary for a plaintilf, in, -' action to recover the possession of real property, to allege
how his estate or ownership is derived, and all he need do is to
state and prove he has a legal or equitable estate in the property
sued for. Likewise, the deibndant can plead or set forth his defence
in as g,.neral terms. lie need only deny generally the plaintiff's
title, without allegations or notice of fraud in the execution of the
contract, deed or conveyance on which the plaintiff relies. The
defendant may offer evidence thereof under his answer, and surprise and successfully destroy the title. Even tax deeds, valid
upon their face. may be attacked and impeached by evidence aliunde,
without the pleadings pointing out any defect. In a word, under
a general denial, we have already held that, in actions of this nature,
the defendant may show, by any legal evidence which he may have,
that lie is the owner of the land in controversy : Hall v. Dodge,
19 Kans. If our code has authorized, upon pleadings of such
general terms, evidence of so broad a quality to be presented, I
see no reason or policy to deny the right to impeach in such a suit
a judgment of the character that Bartlett obtained against Hicks
befire a justice in 1860. The fact that it is prindfacie and presumptive evidence of its truth is a sufficient advantage to the
plaintiff resting upon it, and the party affected thereby having -no
notice by the pleadings that it would be used to sustain any issue,
would be, it seems to me, more greatly prejudiced by a denial of
the right to controvert and disprove it, than the plaintiff would be
if called upon to sustain the jurisdiction of the justice when that
jurisdiction is attacked with the proof that Jane Hicks was not
within the state at the time of the pretendedl service. I see no
valid reason for placing a defendant under this disadvantage against
-t judgment thus obtained. The fairness, the justice and the true
policy is in favor of the right to impeach and annul the judgment.
Under the federal statutes, the plaintiff being a citizen of another
state, and the defendants .citizens of Kansas, either party could
have removed the suit before trial to the United States Circuit
Court for this district. If the defendants had taken advantage of
this statute authorizing such removals, under the decisions of the
federal courts it seems to be settled that the pretended judgment
could have been successfully impeached by the defendants in that
court: Thoml)son v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Kvowles v. The
Gaslightand Coke Co., 19 Id. 58 ; Earle v. .iIe Treigh, 1 Otto 503 ;
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Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163; Webster v. .Reid, 11 Id. 437:
_Elliott v. Piersoll, 1 Pet. 328. See also Pennoyer v. .Neff, Sup.
Ct. of U. S., Feb. 1878, 6 Otto (not yet reported).
If we now hold that the defendants cannot obtain the same rights
under our practice in our own courts, as in the federal courts held
in the state, or if we remit the defendants to other modes of redress
than awarded them in the District Court, we deprive our own courts
of some authority and power, and restrict their procedure upon
grounds of policy unknown to federal practice. We would thus
tend to swell the litigation in the federal courts, whose extensive
and encroaching jurisdiction is already a subject of complaint with
some of the profession, and is viewed by many as perilling. not
only the importance, but the existence of our state courts. In my
view, not only do the principles of natural justice, but likewise the
true principles of policy, considering the provisions of our civil
code and the prior decisions of this court, sustain the opinion of
my learned brother.
BREWER, J.-I dissent from the views expressed by my brethren
in this case. I think that as to all domestic judgments, where
upon the face of' the rec6rd everything is regular, the judgment
rendered upon legal and sufficient service, it is conclusive as against
any colliteral attack. Public policy requires that judicial proceeddngs apparently valid should be held valid as against everything
but a direct attack. Under the rule laid down by the court, a
solemn judgment of any court, even a court of record and of general jurisdiction, may be blown to pieces by the testimony of a
single interested witness in an action in which the pleadings, give
no notice of any question of the validity of the judgment. In any
direct attack, the party claiming rights based upon the judgment
has specific notice, and may prepare his testimony accordingly. In
this very case, if the plaintiff had specific nbtice .of the objbction
to the validity of the judgment, he might perhaps have shown by
many witnesses that the return of the constable was in fact true.
ly brother VALENTrNE has fully referred to the authorities and
arguments, and I simply desire to express my dissent from the
conclusions reached by him.
The court decides that in an action
of ejectment, a sheriff's deed, based
upon a domestic judgment t can be overthrown, by impeaching, by evidence

aliunde, the return of an officer showing
service of a summons. The court, after
anftouneing varions propositions of law
which have very little bearing on the
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case, sayv: " But the difficult question
to deteriine nri'cs wlen it is attempted
to imnpeah a domestic Judgment collaterally and by extrinsic evidence. There
are authorities which hold that it cannot
be done. * * * while there are authorities which hold that it may be done."
A full rcfereuce is made in this connection to the cases on both sides of the
question. The principle is then stated,
that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction i. void, and a long list of cases
cited to sustain it. This principle,
however, has but slight effect upon the
question before the court. Service of
process is essential to jurisdiction, and
there is no doubt of the invalidity of a
judgment rendered without jurisdiction ; but the question here is, how and
in what form and under what circumstances, can such invalidity be shown ?
Courts have frequently and generally
held that the return of an officer cannot
be disputed: that the only remedy for a
mistake or false return is by action
brought against the officer or his bonds..
men. This doctrine has been modified
in Kansas to the extent of holding,
upon a motion -made directly to quash
and set aside the return, that the same
may be disputed as to facts not within
the knowledge of the officer: Bond v.
Wi.on, 8 Kansas 228. : the above
reported decision the court advances
two important steps beyond the doctrine
of Bond v. Wilson, and holds (1) that
such return may be disputed without
reference to the nature of the facts
stated'therein, and (2) that this may
be done collateraly.
Previous to this decision, it was sup.
posed that official returns of officers,
judgments and other proceedings were
shielded from collateral attack. Ogden
v. 1t'altrs, 12 Kansas 282. In this last
cited ease the court decides that an
order of publication cannot be collaterally assailed and shown to be false, for
tle purpose of showing that the fudgmeat is void for want of jurisdiction.

There is reason and force in this view.
It gives sthbility to judicial proceedings,
and value to titles resting upon them.
If titles to real estate derived through
judicial proceedings are constantly
subjcet to overthrow by showing that
an order of publication, or the return
of an officer, is false, and this in an
action of ejectment, where, under our
system of pleading, no notice of such
defect is specifically given, the result
will be that titles of this kind will be
deemed of little value, and the sale of
property always attended with cruel
sacrifice. There is no wonder that
courts have heretofore hesitated, on
substantial grounds of public policy, to
reach this conclusion, and announce a
doctrine attended with such results.
But the inquiry may be made, if the
relurn is false, why require a party to
proceed directly to annul it? The
ready answer is, (1) Because he can
do so without injury to himself. He
could enjoin the proceeding in ejectment until he could prosecute one in
equity to set aside the erroneous proceedings. (2) Because to allow a defendant to spring a question of this
kind, in an actioh of ejeetment, entirely
without notice to the plaintiff, will
always work a surpise-n thing that
courts relieve against, but do not aid in
committing.
One of the principal grounds of the
concurrence of the learned chief justice,
is, that had the judgment been rendered
in the federal courts, as it might have
been on removal from the state court, it
might then have been impeached in the
manner now sanctioned. We do not
think the authorities cited, or any other
decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. sustain this view. The
judgment of a state court, when brought
under review in 4sfederal court, sitting
within the same state, is regarded as a
domestic, and not as a foreign, judgment, and the well-settled doctrine of
the Supreme Court of the United States

-
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is, that foreign judgments only can be
attacked collaterally. In Thompson v.
Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, the court says :
"The records of the domestic courts of
England and some of the states, it is
true, are held to import absolute verity
as well in relation to jurisdictional as
to other facts, in all collateral proceedings. Public policy and the dignity of
the courts are supposed to require that
no averment shall be admitted to contradict the record. But, as we have
seen, that rule has no extra-territorial
force." Here, as well as in the case
of Knowles v. Gaslight and Coke Co., 19
Wall. 58, the court clearly draws a distinction between a domestic and a foreign
judgment. It must be confessed that
it is difficult to see any very substantial

ground for the distinction, but it is also
difficult to see how a decision which
makes it can b deemed an authority
for the -broader proposition that a domestic judgment may be collaterally
attacked.
The question determined by the above
reported decision is certainly one of
more than usual interest and importance. We have examined it, not for
the purpose or with the desire of adding
to or detracting from the able and exhaustive opinion of the court, but with
the hope of eliciting such discussion of
the important principles involved as
may lead to their better understanding
and settlement.
H. B. JouNsoN.

. Supreme Court Commission of Ohio.
LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. JOHN
C. HUTCHINSG, GUARDIAN, ETC. "
Timber was cut from lands of B. by trespassers, who, by their labor, converted
it into cord-wood and railroad-ties, thus increasing its value threefold. It was
then sold to an innocent purchaser, who was sued by B. for the value of the wood
and ties. Whatever might be the rule of damages as against the wrongdoers, as
against innocent purchasers, B. cannot recover the value of the timber as enhanced
by the labor of the wrongdoers., after it was severed from the realty.

ERROR to the District Court of Cuyahoga county.
The petition of plaintiff, as guardian of Joseph and Edward
Barbour, avers that said minors are owners in fee simple of a certain
tract of land in Lake county, and then as follows :"Said land, when owned by said minors, was thickly wooded
with excellent timber, and was very valuable on that account; that
all, or nearly all of said timber, while said land was owned by said
minors, was cut down and removed by persons now to this plaintiff
unknown, without any authority whatever, and the same taken,
used and possessed for its own benefit, and without any authority
whatever, by the Cleveland, Painesville and Ashtabula Railroad
Company, which was on or about the first of April 1869, consolidated with certain other railroad companies under the name and
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style of the Lake Shore & 5Michigan Southlern Railway Company,
which last named1 company is made the defendant in this action.
l13BY
reason of said timber being taken from said land, and converted to its own use by the Cleveland, Painesville & Ashtabula
Railroad Company, said minor children were damaged in the amount
of $4650, for wlich sun by reason of the premises, plaintiff asks
judgment against the defendant, the Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern Railway Company."
The answer denied that plaintiffs were owners in fee simple of
the land in question.
A large quantity of wood and railroad ties was cut upon this
land by persons who were trespassers, acting without legal right,
and sold by them to the railroad company, but it was admitted that
the company purchased and paid for the wood, trees and ties in
good faith, without notice of plaintiff's rights, or that any wrong
had been or was done to their woods. The fair value of the timber
standing upon plaintiff's land, and before cut into cord-wood and
hauled to the defendants' railroad was about $1 per cord; after
being so cut and hauled it was worth about $3 per cord.
The railroad company claimed as the rule of damages that it was
liable only for the value of the timber as it stood upon the ground.
Plaintiff claimed that the company was liable for the wood as it
was increased in value by the labor of the trespassers, cutting and
hauling it. Defendant railroad company asked the court to charge,
"that if the jury find the fact to be that the defendant cut no timber
upon the land of plaintiff's said woods, and employed no person to
do so, but purchased aill the wood and timber of all sorts, that it is
charged with the conversion of, from persons who did cut and remove
it from the land and sold it to defendants; that defendant would
not be liable to the plaintiff for the value of the timber, wood and
ties purchased at the time of the purchase, but only for the value
of the timber before it was cut into wood and ties, and sold to
defendant. That the measure of damages, if the defendant purchased said property in good faith, was the fair value of the timber
standing on the plaintiff's woodland and before it was cut into wood
and ties, and hauled on to the defendants' railway and sold to it."
This charge was refused, and the court did large as follows :"Judge FooT in a former trial of this case settled the rule of
damages to be the value of the timber in the condition it was at the
time it was received and converted by the defendant. This I also
VOL. XXVI-73
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say to you should be the rule you should adopt in ascertaining the
amount of your verdict. I have found it much easier to repose
confidence in the court and adopt its considerations in this question
of damageg, then reconcile myself to its correctness. But you will
take it as the law of the case."
The refusal and charge was excepted to.
On the first trial to the court, November Term 1871, plaintiff
recovered a judgment of $2500. On a second trial to a jury, February term 1872, the verdict was $3843.72; this judgment was
reversed in the District Court. At the third trial, November term
1873, the verdict for plaintiff was $5680, which was reduced by
the court to $3412.72, and judgment was rendered for that amount.
The principal errors assigned are in the charge as to the matter of
title and the rule of damages.
The District Court having affirmed the judgment of the Common
Pleas, a petition in error was filed in the Supreme Court.
James Aason, )9ktess & Burke and W J. Boardman, for plaintiff inerror.
J. -.

Ingersoll, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
WRIGHT, J.-We have not deemed it necessary to solve all the
nice and difficult questions that relate to the plaintiffs' (Barbour's)
title to this land. Whetter or not they had the legal, they did
also claim the equitable title; and there was some evidence to sustain the claim. This question of fact waT left to the jury, who
found, upon it, for plaintiffs below.
We are not clear that this finding was so palpably against the
weight of e'idence as to justify interference by us. We therefore
assume that plaintiffs had title sufficient to maintain the action in
that respect, and proceed to the second point, the rule of damages.
The petition, it will be noticed, is not as for a trespass to real
estate, but to recover the value of the wood and timber stolen.
The action throughout was treated as one to recover that value,
and the case is so treated here.
Upon the point now to be determined, the case is thus : A large
amount of wood is cut down upon plaintiffs' land, and stolen. The
thieves work it up into cord-wood and ties, thus increasing its value
threefold. The depredators then sell it to the railroad company,
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who is entirely innocent in the whole matter. The real owner now
sues the railroad company fir the property takeh from his land.
,l]all he recover one dlar or three ? It is said, upon the one
hand, to be a universal rule of law, that a man's property cannot
be taken from him without his consent, unless by law, and that
stealing can convey no title to the thief. In S'ilbur/ v. McCoon,
3 Coulst. 381, it is said: "It is an elementary principle in the
law of all civilized communities, that no man can be deprived of
his property, except by his own voluntary act, or by operation of
law. The thief who steals a chattel, or the trespasser who takes
it by force, acquires no title by such wrongful taking." It is .then
argued that the thief, having none in himself, could convey no title
to any other person taking it, however innocently. Hence, when
the railroad company obtained the property, they obtained what
was the plaintiffs', and they could have replevied it, increased in
value as it was by the labor of the thief. If this were so, then, it
is argued, the company were liable fior the value of the wood in its
improved condition, enhanced to the extent of threefold.
If the owner were bringing this action against the thieves, perhaps it might be conceded that the full amount could be recovered.
This we understand to be upon the principle "in odium 8poliatori&" The thief will not be allowed to have anything by virtue
of his own wrong; and if he has spent his labor upon stolen goods,
he shall not profit by it. It is his own loss. "The English law
will not allow one man to gain a title to the property of another
upon the principle of accession, if he took the other's property
wilfully as a trespasser :" 2 Kent 363. But it seems to be well
understood that the rights of the parties are made to depend, to a
great extent, upon the intent with which the conversion of property
has been brought about. If it was taken malafide by theft,.or
with a wilful purpose to do wrong, the consequences are different
from those which follow upon the act done under an honest mistake ; and perhaps it is as wise to punish the robber as to protect
the innocent. In treating of confusion of goods, Blackstone speaks
of the difference between cases where the admixture is by consent
of both parties, and when it is by the wilful act of one; and in
regard to the latter the author says : " Our law,. to guard against
fraud, gives .the entire property, without any account, to him whose
original dominion is invaded."
In case of the confusion by consent it is otherwise, and each party retains hi interest. Mr. Cooley,
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in his note to page 404, book 2, recognises the same distinction
between a fraudulent purpose and an innocent mistake. The same
distinction is made 2 Kent 363; Sedgw. Dam. 484.
Field on Damages, sect. 818 says: "There should certainly be
a distinction between a case of mere technical conversion where,
perhaps, the defendant acts in good faith, and that of a wilful conversion and wrong done by the defendant." The cases as to what
is the proper rule of damages when property has been taken and
by the taker improved in condition or enhanced in value are
numerous, but a reference to some will show some of the difficulties
attending the subject. In. &lsburj v. Mc'oon, the corn of one
Wood had been manufactured into whiskey by plaintiff. Defendant,
as judgment creditors of Wood, took it, and plaintiff sued for the
value of the whiskey. The case is first reported in 6 Hill 425.
Here it is decided that the change from corn to whiskey was a
change of identity, and transferred the property to plaintiffs, who
were the manufacturers producing the change. This decision goes
wholly upon the question of identity. There is a learned note to
this case which discusses the question of innocent and wrongful
conversion, and the citations there given from Puffendorf, Justinian
& Wood's Institute are apposite. This case in again reported in 4
Denio 832; here the idea that the rights of the parties depend upon
motives or intention is flatly repudiated; the court holding that as
long as the owner can trace his property he may regain it, thus
again making identity the criterion. The case is reversed 8 Cornstock 881, upon the ground that the animus with which the corn
was converted was an important element, and that if plaintiffs when
they took it knew that they had no right to it, they could obtain
no title, although by the manufacture into whiskey they had changed
the identity. The simple fact therefore that the property can be
traced into its improved state is not always sufficient to insure a
recovery of the improved article or its value. It must be remarked
however, that the text-books do assert that the proposition of identity
is the controlling one. Kent says : "It was a principle settled as
early as the time of the Year Books, that whatever alteration of
form any property had undergone, the owner might seize it in its
new shape, and be entitled to it in its state of improvement, if he
could prove the identity of the original materials; as if leather be
made into shoes, cloth into a coat, or a tree be squared into timber :"
2 Kent 263; Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns. 848; 2 Blacks. 404. It will,
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however, appear that other considerations enter into solution of the
qaI.etion. In lllde v. ('omkson, 21 Barb. 92, it is held that "in
acquirilig title to l)roperty by accession, the law makes a distinction
1)etwecn a wilful anod an involuntarv wrongdoer. The former can
never acquire the title, however great the change wrought in the
original article may be, wliilc the latter may." " Where a manufacturer has expended his money and labor in good fiaith upon
property in pursuance of a contract with the owner, he cannot be
regarded as a wrongdoer, or deprived of the enhanced value which
lie has given to the property in an action by the owner, sounding
in damages." It is said in the course of the opinion that the
"distinction between a wilful and an involuntary wrongdoer, runs
tbrough the authorities, and stands upon the principle that a party
can obtain no right by his own wrong : (p. 105.)
Martin v. -Porter,5 M. & W. 351, was a case where defendant,
in working his coal mine, broke through the barrier and took the
coal under the land belonging to the plaintiff. Plaintiff recovered
the fill value, without any deduction to defendant for his expenses
in getting the coal. But in Iilton v. Woods, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 440,
the rule in .1Iartinv. Porteris limited to cases of fraudulent conduct; and such is the effect of the ease Morgan v. Powell, 3 Ad.
& E., N. S. 278. And in Wood v. l1orewood, 3 Ad. & E., N. S.
441, P'ARKE, B., told the jury that if there was fraud or negligence on the part of defendant, they might give, as damages under
the count in trover, the value of the coals at the time they first
became chattels, on the principle laid down in MArartin v. Porter;
but if they thought the defendant was not guilty of fraud or negligence, but acted fairly and honestly, in the full belief that lie had
the right to do what lie did, they might give the fair value of the
coals, as if the coal fields had been purchased froli the plaintiff."
In Hilton v. Woods, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 432, the head note is:
"In assessing compensation for coal already gotten by defendant,
the court being of opinion that be had worked it inadvertently and
not fraudulently, held that lie was to pay only the fair value of
such coal, as if lie had purchased the mine from defendant."
'IALINS, V. C., says: "There is much difficulty as to the mode
of assessing the compensation to an owner of coal which has been
improperly *'orked by the owner of an adjoining mine. It is clear,
upon the authorities, that a different principle is applicable when
the coal is taken inadvertently, or as in the present case, under a
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bond fide belief of title, and when it is taken fraudulently, with a
full knowledge on the part of the taker that he is doing wrong, or
in other words, committing a robbery."
In these English cases, the right of plaintiff to recover the
increased value of the coal, that is, the value occasioned by the
expense of mining, is made to depend on the avimv~us of the party
committing the trespass. If he stole, he loses his labor and money;
if he made an honest mistake, he dees not incur that loss, and the
owner only recovers the value of the coal without its accession.
There would seem to be a very short way out of these difficulties,
if the question of identity was the only one. There was no trouble
in the owner identifying his coal ; but this does not entitle him to
recover its value increased by mining, except in case of bad faith.
It should be noted that Gegou v. Vivian, Law Rep. 6 Ch. App.
742, seems disposed to limit this rule of damages to cases at law,
not applying it in equity.
There are a number of coal cases in Pennsylvania. In Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Penna. St. 291, Chief Justice LowRIE, after
discussing the conflict in the cases, says: "We prefer the rule
in Wood v. Morewood, where PARKE, B., decided, in a case of
trover for taking coals, that if the defendant acted fairly and
honestly, in the full belief of his right, then the measure of
damages is the fair value of the coals as if the coal field had been
purchase. from the plaintiff." When the defendant's conduct,
measured by the ordinary standard of morality and care, which is
the standard of the law, is not chargeable with fraud, violence, or
wilful negligence or wrong, the value of the property taken and
converted is the just measure of compensation. If raw material
has, after appropriation and without such using, been changed by
manufacture into a new species of property, as grains into whiskey,
grapes into wine, fur into hats, hides into leather, or trees. into
lumber, the law either refuses the action of trover for the new
article, or limits the recovery to the value of the original article.
When there is no wrongful purpose or wrongful negligence in the
defendant, compensation for the real injury done is the.purpose of
all remedies; and so long as we'bear this in mind, we shall have
but little difficulty in managing the forms of action so as to secure
a fair result. If the defendant in this case was guilty of no intentional wrong, be might not have been charged with the value of
the coal after he had been at the expense of mining it, but only
with its value in place, and with such other damage to the land as
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its minin1g iuayv have caused." This ease also holds that no change
ill tlr fim of action can vary theIrule of damages.
In 11r.rdi. v. wUiny, 55 Penn. 4t. 176, defendant had been cut1iii., timber on his own tract, and by mistake cut some upon an
adj,,ining tract of plaintifth. The trespass was not wilfid or wanton,
but was in a ,ondfide belief of title. The logs had been driven
to tie boon. and plaintiff sought to recover their value at that
plac, hicli was of course enlanced by the labor and expense
defendant had put upon them. But it was held that the rule of
damages was the value of the timber in the stump where the trees
were cut. A;Ni.;w, C. J., says: "If defendant denies that his
trespass was wilful or wanton, and claims a right to the additional
vale given to the chattel by his labor and money in converting
and traI.-porting it to the place where it is replevied, he has it in
his power to bring the damages of the plaintiff to their true
standard. In a case of inadvertent trespass, or one done under a
bond-iMe but mistaken belief of right, this would generally be ihe
value of the logs at the boom less the cost of cutting, hauling and
driving to the boom. Such a standard of damages, growing out of
the nature of the act and of the form of action, is reasonable, and
does justice to both parties. It saves to the otherwise innocent
defendant his labor and money, and gives to the owner the enhancement of the value of his property growing out of other circumstances. such as a rise in the market price, a difference in price
between localities, or other adventitious causes :" Coleman's Appeal,
62 Penn. $t. 252-248. In the case of Barton Coal (o. v. Walter
Co.r, 39 _1d. 1,the question is much discussed and the authorities
reviewed.
In Heard v.James, 49 Miss. 236, the rule of damages in case
of conversion is said to be determined by the animus of the party
trespa.sing. If the act was in good faith, upon some supposed
right or claim, or error, the rule is the value of the property where
taken , but if the taking be characterized by malice or oppression,
damages may be punitive, and in an action no allowance will be
made tihe defendant for any increased value bestowed on the pro-'
perty by his skill and labor. In this case trees had been cut down
on plaintiff's land and made into staves, and' the question was
whether plaintiff should recover as damages the value of the staves,
or only of the trees as they stood on his ground. The plaintiff
was allowed to recover the full value, allowing defendants nothing
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for their labor in working up the timber into staves, and upon the
principle stated. The court says: "The conduct of defendants
was wilful, utterly regardless of the rights of the plaintiff." That
the intent of the defendants is material in regard to damages, has
always been recognised in our law. Upon this is founded the
whole idea of exemplary damages. We know it has been strenuously urged in what has been called "t h e speculative notions of
fanciful writers" (MeBride v. 3[eLauglin, 5 Watts 375; Sedgw.
463), that punishment belongs only to the administration of crirninal law and has no proper place in that civil procedure which
adjusts only the rights of parties; but the principle is too firmly
settled to be controverted now: Pratt v. Pond, 42 Conn. 811;
Walker v. Puller,29 Ark. 448 ; Grund v. Van Veck, 59 Ill. 478.
And yet the rule should be carefully applied, as it may leave to
courts and juries to determine the extent of punishment, unrestricted by the well-defined limits of statutory enactment. Therefore it is that there are authorities holding that even in cases of
wilful trespass, if the trespasser has made a large increase in value
of the property by his labor, it will not be allowed that it shall all
go to the original owner, because it is said to be unjust. The fact
that the trespasser is to lose the labor and expense lie has put upon
property he has wrongfully taken, results as a punishment to him
fo" what he has done; on this ground the original owner recovers
the increased value, not because of any rights in him, but because
the law gives this inflictioh as a terror to offenders. Yet the punishment must be proportioned in some way to the circumstances of
the case, and a proper inquiry is, in what manner and to what
extent should the trespasser suffer ? and conversely, what should
be the kind and measure of redress to the injured party? BROWN,
J., puts this case (Silsbury v. IlfcCoon, 4 Den. 337): "A trespasser
who takes iron-ore and converts it into watch-springs, by which its
value is increased a thousandfold, should not be hanged, nor should
he lose the whole of the new product. Either punishment would
be too great. Nor should the owner of the ore have the watchsprings, for it would be more than a just measure of redress."
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopts the same idea. In the
case of Single v. Schneider, 30 Wis. 570 even in a case where
logs were wilfully cut from the premises of another, they say it
is unnecessarily severe that defendant should lose the value of all
their labor: s. c. 24 Wis. 299 ; Waynzouth v. C. & N. If.Rail-
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rnoa7, 17 Id. 550 ; Ilungefrd v. Relf, rd, 29 Id. 345. An intere"tinig discussion of the question of daages by Judge COOLEY is to
be fiiind iii J1etherbee v. Green, 22) 'Mich. 311, the syllabus of
which is - -No test which satisfies the reason of the law can be
applicd in the adjustment of questions of title to chattels by accession,
unless it keeps in view the circumstances of relative values. The
purpose of the law will not be gained by establishing arbitrary distinctions based upon physical reasons; but its object must be to
adjust the redress afforded to one party, and the penalty inflicted
on the other, as near as the circumstances will permit, to rules of
substantial justice. A ry great increase in value in the change
of property from one form to another, is of more importance in
determining the rights of parties in it than any inexpensive chemical
chalge or mechanical transformation however radical. And where
timber of the value of $25 had been in the exercise of what was
supposed to be proper authority converted into hoops of the value
of $700, the title to the property, in its converted form, passed to
the party by whose labor in good faith the change had been wrought."
In this case it was a conceded fact, that the taking of the timber
was in good faith, defendant supposing that he had a license so to
do from the owner of the land. In this, however, it appears .he
was mistaken. Judge COOLEY discusses very fully the distinction
between cases where property is taken innocently and where it is
taken dishonestly, and recognises the proposition that the rule of
le also discusses the rule already
damages is varied accordingly.
so frequently spoken of, that when the owner can trace the identity
of his property he may reclaim it, however it may be increased in
value. But this he seems to think an unsatisfactory test, the purpose of the law'being to adjust the redress afforded to the one party
and the penalty inflicted upon the other, as near as the circumstances will permit, to the rules of substantial justice. If one had
a stick of timber stolen and could distinctly trace it into a house
being newly built, the identification might be beyond peradventure,
yet no one could claim that the owner of the stick could recover the
whole house either in ejectment,.or its value in damages. Or a
particular piece of wood might be followed intq an organ, but the
owner of the wood could not replevy the organ. When the right to
the improvdd article is the point in issue, certainly the question
should be considered how much the property or labor of each had
contributed to make it what it is, at least in those cases where no
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bad faith exists. It cannot therefore be true in every instance that
because a man can trace his property he can always recover it,
regardless of the circumstances under which it has come into the
hands of the present holder, regardless of its improved condition,
and regardless of the injury, an absolute and unconditional recaption may occasion. The law, as Judge CooIE.y says, endeavors to
do what is right and just between the parties, and while it will
seek to compensate the real owner will not occasion outrage to one
who has been innocent. It may be that if these owners had found
their wood in the hands of the trespassers it might have been retaken
or its value as cord-wood recovered; but if so, it would be upon the
principle in odium. soliatoris; the thief could gain nothing- by
his own wrong and therefore the results of his labor go to the
owners of the property. But this principle cannot apply where
an innocent purchaser comes into the case, for the simple reason that
he has done no wrong.
It is very true the wilful trespasser or thief can convey no title
to one to whom he sells, however innocent the purchaser may be.
But the question right here is, what does " itle '"in this connection, mean ? The original owner has the '1title" to his timber,
and.as against the thief, the title to the results of that thief's labor,
the wrongdoer, as it were being esto'pped from setting up any
claim, by virtue of the wrong he has done. -Against the innocent
purchaser from the thief the original owner still has the "title" to
his timber; but by virtue of what does he now hve "title" to the
results of the thief's labor ? The estoppel, so to call it, being
created by fraud or wrong, exists only against the one guilty of
that fraud or wrong, which the purcliaser is not; and while it is
effectual against the wrongdoer, the reason of it does not exist
against the innocent man, as to whom it therefore fails. As Judge
COOLEY says, it does not comport with justice and equity, that
against those who have done no wrong, those owners should recover three times the value of what they have lost. They have
never spent one cent of money nor one hour of labor in changing
this timber, worth -one dollar, into cord-wood worth three. All
this was done by some one else; and why should the owner recover
it ? If they are compensated for what they have lost, and all they
have lost, they are certainly fully paid : Woolsey v. Seeley, Wright
(Ohio) 360; and this is all they should be allowed to recover.
For this error in the charge the judgment is reversed.
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SuPrem,, Court of indiana.
S.A.MUEL W. SHORT r.3MA11(ARET STOTTS.
It wac tie principles of the common law that were brought to this country by

the colon iq-,
and not mierely the adjudications.
Therefore, if; by the principh-- ol the common law, an action would lie in a
given va-c, it i immaterial that no precedent can be found for it in th English
report, prior to the ,ett lveient of this (ountry.
Although que-tions of' marriage were of ecclesiastical cognizance solely, at the
time of the ,ctlemcnt of this country, yet it seems that the common-law courts
took juridictioun of actions for breach of promise of marriage at that time.
No precedent, however, is found before ,Itch,v. Parkcr, I Roll. Abr. 22. decile, in 1639, after the foundation of the colony of Virginia, the date fixed by
statute in Indiana asi
the time of the adoption of the common law.
An action may be sustained for breach of a verbal promise of marriage. It is
not within the clause of the Statute of Frauds, which says no action shall be
brought to charge any person upon "any agreement or promise made in consideration of marriage," unless in writing.

APPELAL from the Daviess Circuit Court.

This was an action

by tile appellee against the appellant, for breach of contract, of

Issue: trial by jury. Verdict and judgment for
plaintiff.
The following were the principal errors assigned:
1st. The Circuit Court erred in giving judgment against the
deftendant upon a complaint that contains no good cause of action.
2d. In giving judgment upon a cause of action barred by the
marriage.

Statute of Frauds.
3d. In overruling defendant's first demurrer to the amended
coml)laint.
J. IT.O'eal and S. 11. Short, for appellant.
Putnam and Priedly, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WOtDE N, J.-There is nothing in the 3d assignment of error.
A detnurrer to the complaint, for want of sufficient facts, was overruled, and afterwards the plaintiff, on leave, amended her complaint
again, so that the complaint to which the first -demurrer was filed
went out of the case. It is not material whether the complaint
whie-h thus went out of the case was good or bad. The material
q(.-tion is, whether the complaint on which the case was tried was
good or otherwise; and this is all the question that is raised by the
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1st, 2d and 4th assignments of error. The complaint on which
thd case was finally tried consisted of two paragraphs, the first of
which is as follows :
"The plaintiff, Margaret Stotts, for her amended complaint
herein, complains of the defendant, Samuel W. Short, and says
that, on the 1st day of July 1869, she was, and still is, unmarried.
That on said day defendant, in consideration of a promise by plaintiff that she would marry him, undertook, and agreed to marry the
plaintiff, within reasonable time thereafter, upon request. That
the plaintiff, confiding in said promise, has always since remained
and is now ready and ivilling to marry the defendant. But she
avers that the defendant, although often by her requested, and
especially so requested on or about the 10th day of March 1870,
has heretofore, then, and ever since refused, and still refuses to
marry the plaintiff. And further, that on the 13th day of September 1871, at the county of Monroe and state of Indiana, the
defendant, in violation of his promise to her as aforesaid, married
one Jennie Batterton. And plaintiff avers that, by reason of the
refusal and failure to marry her, as he had aforesaid promised and
agreed to do, she became sick and greatly afflicted in body and
mind, and so remained sick and distressed from that time to the
present; and for all the matters herein complained of she says she
has been damaged in the full sum of five thousand dollars, for
which sum she demands judgment, and for all other proper relief."
The second paragraph is not essentially unlike the first. It sets
up mutual promises to marry, and that the defentant had broken
his promise and married Jennie Batterton. We need not, for the
purpose of this case, set out the second paragraph.
The counsel for the appellant, in an elaborate brief, take the
position that the complaint is not good, because there is no law in
Indiana which authorizes an action to recover damages for the
breach of a contract to marry. The position of the counsel is,
that the only law governing this state is :
1. The constitution of the United States and of this state.
2. The statutes of the General Assembly of the state in force,
and not inconsistent with such constitutions.
8. All statutes of the United States in force and relating to
subjects over which Congress has power to legislate for the states,
and not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States.
4. The common law of England, and statutes of the British
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Par]li;ment. nadc in aid thereof prior- to the fourth year of the
rciIl of, J:aies L.. anl which are of a geleral nature, not local to
that kingdon, and not inconsistent mit the first, second and third
spccifivations of this section 1 I. S. 1876, p. 605.
A like provision in reference to the common law of England,
and lie statutes made in aid thereof, - as adopted by tile governor
anid judges of the the territory as early as 179.5 ,:'tevenson
v.
w, ,. 5 Blackf. 92. And it has probably been continued in every
r.evision of the statutes of the state since its organization. Substantially the same provision was adopted by the convention of
Virginia in 1776 : 1 Kent Coin., 12th ed., p. 473, note a. Perhaps the states and territories northwest of the Ohio river, which
adopted the provision, drew it from Virginia. It may not be
unworthy of observation that the fourth year of the reign of James
the First, 1607, was the year of the founding of Jamestown, an
event which it may be supposed led to the fixing of that particular
date.
We proceed to state the appellant's argument more definitely.
It is claimed that as the sources of our law are as above stated, and
as neither the common law of England nor any statute made in aid
thereof, prior to the period mentioned (1607), authorized such
action, it follows that we have no law which authorizes the action.
The counsel for the appellant, in their brief, which shows much
industry and research, claim that prior to the year 1607, the contract for marriage was one exclusively of ecclesiastical, and not of
common-law jurisdiction; and that prior to that time no action had
been maintained in a common-law court for the breach of such contract. We are referred by counsel to the case between Stretch
and P arker, 1 Roll. Abr. 22, as the first case in which such action
was maintained in England, and this was in 1639. We have not
found any case of an earlier date. The case of Ifoleraft v. -Dickerson, Carter 233, decided in 25 Charles 2, is an important one,
and shows, as it seems to us, that it was always regarded as a principle of common law that an action would lie for damages in such
C;~e. The case is stated thus: "An action on the case upon a
,romise. The plaintiff declares that on the 10th of November,
21 Car. 2, in consideration she did promise and assume to marry
the defendant within a fortnight, the defendant did assume and
promise within a fortnight to marry her, and says that this hindered her preferment to her damage of 1001. Verdict for the
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plaintiff."
On motion in arrest of judgment, three of the four
judges were in favor of entering judgment for the plaintiff.
ELLIS, J., thought the action well brought, and said, amongst other
things, " My reason is, here is a mutual contract between the
parties about a lawful thing, and I hold it is not merely a spiritual
act. True ecclesiastical courts have conusance of it. If one
pleads, Nient aecouple en loyal matrinony, they shall judge and
bind us; but if he pleads, .Nient sa feme, it shall be tried by the
common law. Anciently marriage did not belong to the ecclesiastical court-not till the time of Pope Alexander III. Selden
will tell you what the rights of marriage were originally; it was
not a thing of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. If a suit were in this
court concerning a marriage to be executed in specie, we have
nothing to do in it, when there is aetus contra actumn, action will
lie at common law. We bring not the action to meddle with the
marriage, but for the damages that lie bath not taken her according to his promise." AITKIMS, J., said: "I am for judgment for
the plaintiff. It hath been strongly objected that there is nothing
in the case but what is of mere ecclesiastical conusance
In the
ancient year-books the matter is much disputed, yet the year-books
are with some distinction: 45 Edw. 3, 24. 'If the promise to
marry be by deed, then it is triable at common law. Otherwise
not, if without deed. * * * Later authorities are full. Objection:
This entitling the common-law courts to promises of marriage was
in troublesome times. Response: Stretch and Parker's Case was
before the troublesome times."
Here follows the citation of other
authorities, and the opinion proceeds: "It is not for us to go contrariant to these judgments; that which toucheth matrimony,
whether lawful or not lawful, ought to be tried in the spiritual
court; but in our case the spiritual court cannot give remedy
for damages." WINDHAMI, J., said: "Action upon the case upon
a promise for a portion; this is not our case properly. The cases
cited are put where marriage was consummated. In our own case
there is no marriage, no way whereby the spiritual courts can be
entitled to it. The books speak much of the consideration of the act
being grounded upon ecclesiastical matter; that therefore it ought
to be questioned there; yet the books all agree that if there be a
temporal matter doth interpose whereupon the action is grounded,
remedy may be had at the common law; a man may sue for one
thing in the ecclesiastical court, and at common law too; one sues
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for a pension properly in the spiritual court; yet if it be upon a
grralt. by the parson and patron, lie may sue for it at the common
law ; that case (45 Edw. :3, 24), which puts the distinction of a
deed and no deed, I caimot understand the difference, for one is as

much a teniporal act as the other is ; the cases are infinite. You
will not find a case a ours is, where the marriage is not consummate. As our case is, I think the action will lie ; here is a mutual
promise. Mutual promises are good considerations to support
actions upon the case ; in our case there is a mutual promise, and
a promise of marriage, too, than which is no greater consideration."
VAUH.NAX, J., was of a different opinion. lie said, amongst other
things: "A proinise to take one to husband absolutely, notwithstanding any impediment; this is not a good promise, and the
impediments are to be judged in the spiritual court; and this
reason differs this case from the rest. If a man call another
' heretic,' an action lies not here, because, if the defendant justify,
this court cannot judge of it; and so is our own case. If she
promises to marry him absolutely, here she cannot allege an impediment, as she might do in the ecclesiastical court, and the
promise in question must be necessarily intended if there were no
impediment."
We have thus quoted largely from the opinions of the judges in
tile foregoing case, not only for the purpose of showing the views
of the court upon the question involved, but also illustrating in
some degree, the struggle between the courts of common law and
the ecclesiastical courts.
In Anglo-Saxon times there was no distinction between tile lay
and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction; the county court was as much
a spiritual as a temporal tribunal; tile rights of the church were
ascertained and asserted at the same time, and by the same judges,
as the rights of the laity. It was not until after the Norman conquest that tile common law and the ecclesiastical courts were separated and the latter invested with sole jurisdiction over ecclesiastical
causes: 3 Chitty's Blacks., pp. 62-3. Until the pontificate of
Pope Alexander III., which commenced in 1159, marriage it seems
was not a matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Now, the case from
which we have so largely quoted establishes that, by the principles
of tile commnon law, which existed long anterior to 1607, an action
for the breach of contract for mnarriige will lie. Indeed, tile principle which upholds such action is as old as the principle which
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gives damages in any case for the breach of a contract. And it is
immaterial whether any case can be found in England prior to
1607 in which such action has been maintained. The principle is
what we have adopted as a part of the common law. The doubt
which seems to have arisen in the early cases was, not whether, oil
the principles of the common law, the action would lie, but whether,
as the ecclesiastical courts had conusance of matrimonial matters,
such action could be maintained in a common-law court. Thus
VAUGIAN, J., in the case above cited, thought it could not, because,
if there was any impediment to the marriage, it could not be shown
in the common law courts. But the establishment of separate
ecclesiastical courts in England was no part of the common law.
"William First," says Blackstone, "was at length prevailed
upon to establish this fatal encroachment, and separate the ecclesiastical courts from the civil : 3 Blacks. Com. 63. Nor were any
statutes of England on the subject of such separate ecclesiastical
courts, statutes in aid of the common law, but rather in derogation of it; and they were local to that kingdom, and never
in force here. The whole system of ecclesiastical courts, as separate from the civil, is foreign to our institutions, and has no place
in our jurisprudence. There is here, therefore, no conflict of
jurisdiction between the courts of the one class and the other.
Here all wrongs are redressed and remedies furnished in the civil
tribunals. And there is no reason why an action may not be
maintained for the breach of contract for marriage, in our courts,
according to the principles of the common law.
Besides this, the statute has recognised the right of bringing
such action by giving the Circuit Court jurisdiction thereof; 2
R. S. 1876, p. 6, § 5.
We proceed to another point made by the appellant. It is
insisted that the contract is within the Statute of Frauds, which
provides that no actions shall bb brought "to charge any person
upon any agreement or promise made in consideration of marriage,"
unless the contract shall be in writing: 1 R. S. 1876, p. 502. Our
statute in this respect is like that of Car. 2, of which Chitty says:
"Nor need a promise to marry be reduced to writing, for the statute 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, see. 4, applies to promises in considerationof
marriage, not to promises to marry: 2 Chit. on Cont., 11 Am.
ed., p. 791. To the same effect are the cases of CUark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495, and Ogden v. Ogden, 1 Bland 284. Whatever
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may have been the early decisions upon this point, the law is well
settled s above stated. We are of opinion that the complaint was
good. This disposes of all the errors assigned except the last, the
overruling of the motion for a new trial. The counsel for the
appellant have discussed, under this assignment, the propriety of
an amendment allowed to be made to the complaint, and the refusal
of the court to continue the cause.
Without stopping to consider whether these points -are properly
presented by the record, we are of opinion that the amendment
was properly allowed, and the continuance properly refused. It
appears by a bill of exceptions that, on the trial of the cause, the
plaintiff having given evidence of her general character for chastity, the defendant offered to prove the statements of one Johnson,
who was dead at the time of the trial, to the effect that he had had
sexual intercourse with her, but on objection the evidence was
excluded. This was clearly right. The statements of Johnson
could have been but hearsay. The plaintiff had a right, even if her
character for chastity could be assailed by proof of specific facts, to
have the evidence come under the sanction of an oath. The death
of Johnson may have been a misfortune to the defendant, but that was
no ground for admitting Johnson's unsworn statements in evidence.
The court gave to the jury the following instruction : "1So far as
any testimony in the case may go to show a seduction or mere
illicit intercourse between the parties may tend to prove or disprove
the question in issue, that is, whether the parties contracted to
marry each other, the jury may consider it." This instruction is
objected to. The evidence is not in the record, and we cannot tell
what the evidence was to which the instruction applied, nor whether
it was introduced by the plaintiff or defendant; nor can we say
whether it was introduced by consent or otherwise- of the parties.
We cannot say there was any error in the instruction. It was but
saying that if the evidence going to show a seduction, or illicit
intercourse between the parties, tended to prove or disprove the
issue, it was to be considered. This must be true of all competent
evidence that tends to prove or disprove the issue; and no question
is made in the record as to the competency of the evidence.
We have thus passed upon the questions arising in the record,
and find no error in the case.
The judgment is affirmed.
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